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Abstract
State Regulatory Heterogeneity and Clean Water Act Compliance
Quinn Beeson
This research evaluates the impact of state regulations regarding Clean Water Act (CWA)
compliance on wastewater and drinking water violations in the continental United States from
2007 to 2017. Using data collected from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
community characteristics and state regulations are analyzed for their effects on CWA
compliance. We use count data analysis techniques and annual county-level data on CWA and
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) violations from wastewater and drinking water facilities in
the United States. The results show that total violations are higher when an additional state CWA
regulation is implemented. One year after a new regulation is implemented, however, we observe
a decrease in total violations relative to the number of violations prior to the introduction of
additional policy or regulation. Total violations may decrease after the introduction of new
regulations and policies as the facilities update their procedures, enforcement, or technology to
be in compliance with new standards. Research findings confirm previous literature that higher
non-white populations experience greater numbers of water violations, but also show that
increased average per capita income mitigates the number of violations when the non-white
population percentage is also taken into consideration.
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Introduction
According to the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE, 2017), wastewater
treatment plants are the most critical and basic infrastructure system for protecting the health of
the nation and the environment. Clean drinking water is also needed to support daily life in
developed societies. In the United States (US), there are more than 800,000 miles of public
sewer lines and an additional 500,000 miles of private sewers that connect to the public sewer
lines, as well as one million miles of pipes for drinking water (ASCE, 2017). Both wastewater
and drinking water treatment facilities are usually overseen by a local utility or a public works
department to ensure that state and federal water quality standards are met before the treated
water is discharged. Approximately 76% of the US population relies on public facilities for
wastewater treatment and 90% of Americans rely on the public water system for drinking water.
Additionally, more than $271 billion is needed to invest in maintaining and updating wastewater
infrastructure in the United States to meet current and future needs, while an estimated $1 trillion
is needed to update drinking water infrastructure in the next 25 years (ASCE, 2017). Much of
this investment is needed to update failing facilities that are struggling with water quality below
the national standards, which is affecting the health of the US population (Allaire et al., 2018).
Major events in recent years such as the Flint, Michigan crisis, the Elk River chemical
spill in West Virginia, and the toxic algae blooms in Toledo, Ohio have been well-publicized and
brought the importance of water quality to the forefront of discussions on infrastructure needs.
Concern for the health and well-being of the US population motivates the question of how often
water quality standards are being violated and, perhaps more importantly, why.
The water quality standards that regulate discharge from wastewater treatment plants are
under the CWA, while the provision of drinking water is regulated by the SDWA. The CWA
prohibits the discharge of any regulated pollutant from a point source into navigable waters
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without a permit from the EPA. The permits set restrictions on the type and quantity of pollutants
the owners of the permits can discharge. The SDWA sets regulatory standards for drinking water
quality. Both the CWA and the SDWA charge states and Native American tribes with primary
oversight and enforcement responsibility, with a requirement to maintain regulatory standards at
least as stringent as the EPA’s. In addition, the CWA regulates the overall quality of surface
water in the United States, while the SDWA has regulations regarding surface water when it is
treated for use as drinking water, leading to overlapping oversight between the two Acts
(Tiemann, 2017).
States interpret the federal regulations differently and many have enacted their own, more
stringent requirements or standards than the mandates imposed by the EPA. Therefore,
comparisons of violations that occur in states with additional regulations to states where water
quality standards follow only the federal regulations may be misleading if differences in
regulations are not explicitly taken into account. In addition, a comparison of violation numbers
across years within a state that enacted additional regulations can also be misleading without a
proper account of the change in the regulatory environment. On one hand, additional state
regulations could lead to more violations; stricter requirements make it more difficult for the
wastewater treatment and drinking water facilities to remain in compliance. On the other hand,
additional state regulations could decrease the number of violations if compliance with additional
regulations requires significant updates in technology or procedures. Investment in technology
and improvements in operational procedures can have a significant effect on water quality in that
violations can actually decrease despite an increase in the stringency of the regulations.
We examine how state regulatory policies, as well as community characteristics, affect
compliance with the CWA and the SDWA, using the most up-to-date panel data from the EPA
on health-related wastewater and drinking water violations from facilities that serve a population
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of at least 500. Although drinking water quality is directly enforced by policies implemented
under the SDWA, in this paper we consider the possibility that drinking water violations may be
affected by state-level CWA policies because there is overlapping oversight of water bodies.
Thus, we include drinking water violations that affect public health in our analysis.
A limited number of studies examine the US drinking water system’s compliance with
the SDWA at the national level, and no study considers the effects of the heterogeneity in state
regulations on compliance with the CWA. Most of the literature that examines compliance with
drinking water regulations across states relies only on the national water quality standards set by
the SDWA, disregarding additional state regulations. Instead, literature that has demonstrated
what affects drinking water violation occurrence has focused mainly on community
characteristics and ownership of the facilities (Wallsten and Kosec, 2008; Balazs et al., 2011;
Konisky and Teodoro, 2016; Allaire et al., 2018; Switzer and Teodoro, 2018). Other authors,
such as Rubin (2013), focused solely on facility-level characteristics.
Some literature has discussed that states make various regulatory decisions regarding the
CWA based on their unique circumstances (Travis et al., 2004), while others have pointed out
that states have varying degrees of CWA enforcement (Rechtschaffen, 2004). Demonstrations of
heterogeneity in state-level water quality regulations motivate the basic hypothesis. We argue
that because states have primacy to implement the EPA’s CWA standards, they will not do so
consistently, resulting in heterogeneity in violation rates.
The most applicable literature concerning the CWA makes the argument that states have
differing priorities, thus their water quality policies and enforcement will also vary. This research
also examines the very localized characteristics that make states unique (Earnhart 2004;
Rechtschaffen 2004; Travis et al. 2004; Stoner 2017; Chakraborti and McConnell 2012). We
contribute to the CWA and SDWA related literature by considering the number of state

3

Quinn Beeson

regulations implemented under the CWA, as a measure of state stringency and heterogeneity
regarding water quality. There is no literature that compares wastewater quality across states,
using the most up-to-date data from the EPA.
This thesis examines the variables that influence the occurrence of wastewater and
drinking water violations in the continental US from 2007 to 2017. Using data collected from the
EPA, we analyze whether community characteristics and CWA related state regulations affect
compliance with the CWA and the SDWA. We use count data analysis techniques and annual
county-level data on CWA and SDWA violations from wastewater and drinking water facilities
in the United States.
We find that in the year in which additional state CWA regulations are implemented,
total violations increase, i.e. the number of state CWA regulations has a positive impact on
violations. One year after a new regulation is implemented, however, there is a decrease in total
violations, presumedly as facilities update their procedures, enforcement, or technology to be in
compliance with the new standards. Research findings also confirm previous literature that
higher non-white populations experience greater numbers of water violations, but we
demonstrate that increased average per capita income mitigates the number of violations when
also taking the non-white population percentage into consideration.
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: first, the CWA and SDWA backgrounds
will be examined. Second, the literature review will cover papers that address both wastewater
and drinking water issues. The third section will cover a data description, again addressing both
wastewater and drinking water data, as well as community characteristics from census data and a
description of how we define and collect separate state regulations. The fourth will be a
discussion of the empirical methodology, then a discussion of the results, and finally a
conclusion.
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2. Background
2.1 Clean Water Act (CWA)
In 1948, the newly passed Federal Water Pollution Control Act became the first major
US law to address water pollution. Amendments to the law in 1972 and 1977 became known as
the Clean Water Act. The 1972 amendments gave the EPA authority to set wastewater standards
and continue authorizing water quality standards for surface water but delegated the
responsibility for issuing and enforcing the standards to individual states under the EPA’s
supervision (Chakraborti and McConnell, 2012). The overarching goal of the CWA is to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters. In addition,
and most applicable to this research, the CWA made it unlawful for anyone to discharge any
regulated pollutant from a point source (such as a wastewater treatment plant) into navigable
waters without a permit (U.S. EPA, 2017).
The CWA covers all water with a “significant nexus to navigable waters” in the United
States. This includes streams, rivers, lakes, and oceans. In addition to the overall water quality of
navigable waters, the CWA is responsible for standards implementing the maintenance of
wetlands. This thesis will focus on the main objective of the CWA, that of wastewater standards
and discharge permits.
Wastewater comes from households, businesses, and industry through public sewer lines
and stormwater drains. Wastewater is any used water that comes from a household, business,
school, or industry. It includes water from sanitary sewage, dishwashers, showers, car washes,
laundries, and other sources. Treatment facilities remove toxins from the wastewater before
discharging it back into the local water source. According to the Water Environment Federation
(WEF), only 0.06% of wastewater is actual waste material (WEF, 2017). The other 99.94% is
water. The waste itself may be dissolved in the water or be in particulate form. It can include
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anything from human waste, food particles, oil, dirt, pharmaceuticals, cleaning chemicals,
personal care products, or any number of other chemicals and toxins.
Point sources, such as wastewater treatment facilities, are regulated by the CWA’s
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program. NPDES permits are issued
to any facility that discharges directly into any surface water in the United States. Regulated
entities include industrial and municipal facilities and include discharges from municipal
wastewater overflows, stormwater, and treated sewage sludge from wastewater treatment
facilities called biosolids. The EPA enforces permits by issuing administrative orders against a
facility with violations, or even seeking civil or criminal penalties when necessary. Most states
are responsible for monitoring facilities for NPDES program compliance, as well as enforcing
permit requirements. The EPA has a responsibility to directly implement the NPDES program in
four states; Idaho, New Mexico, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire (U.S. EPA, 2019a). For the
purposes of this research, wastewater treatment facilities’ compliance with the NPDES program
is used as a proxy for CWA compliance and we include the four states where the NPDES
program is implemented by the EPA.
To understand the effect of state-level regulations on violations, this research examines
discharge monitoring data of public wastewater systems across the country. Facilities report
pollutant discharge monitoring data in their discharge monitoring report forms (DMR), which are
compared to NPDES permit requirements to determine a facility’s compliance. The permit data
contain the NPDES limits for water quality standards such as flow, temperature, dissolved
oxygen, and specific chemicals. A violation occurs any time discharge from a treatment facility
into surface waters contains a regulated pollutant amount above the permit limit.
The EPA provides a list of pollutants, originally published in 1977 for the
implementation of the 1976 Toxic Pollutant List, that are regulated under the CWA, but explains
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that it is outdated and states should use the list only as a starting point when creating discharge
standards and NPDES permits (U.S. EPA, 2019b). Neither Congress nor the EPA has added to
the list since 1977, although a few pollutants were removed at various times by the EPA when it
was concluded they did not need to be on the list (U.S. EPA, 2019b). The priority pollutant list
provided by the EPA is included in Appendix 1. Many other pollutants not included on the
priority pollutant list are also regulated by the CWA and individual states. Therefore, the
violation data used in this research may include chemicals that are not on this list, while some
chemicals on this list may not be part of the permit violations data anymore.
2.2 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) passed in 1974 and received major amendments
in 1986 and 1996. The SDWA is meant to protect the US public drinking water supply and
regulates both facilities and drinking water sources such as rivers, springs, reservoirs, lakes, and
groundwater wells (Tiemann, 2017). The result is an overlap of regulatory standards between the
SDWA and the CWA, as the CWA also regulates the same bodies of water. Most standards
under the SDWA apply to the finished, treated water. However, the quality of the source water
before treatment can also affect the final drinking water quality. Although drinking water quality
is directly enforced by policies implemented under the SDWA, we assume in this paper that it is
indirectly affected by the CWA policies because of the overlapping oversight of water bodies.
Thus, by recognizing different standards for water quality across different states, this paper
incorporates drinking water violations in our analysis of CWA compliance.
The EPA delegates primary enforcement responsibility of public water systems to the
states but provides a list of minimum standards that must be met by public facilities (U.S. EPA,
2020a). States also experience heterogeneity in SDWA regulations (Rechtschaffen, 2004;
Konisky and Teodoro, 2016; and Allaire et al., 2018). Like the CWA, the SDWA enforces
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compliance by issuing administrative orders against the drinking water facility with violations, or
even seeking civil or criminal penalties when necessary.
According to the EPA, there are three different categories of public water systems, which
include: a non-transient non-community water system, which may serve a population such as a
school or a hospital less than year-round; a transient non-community water system, which
provides water in places like gas stations and campgrounds; and a community water system,
which serves the same population all year round.
Under the SDWA, drinking water facilities are required to report their violations in the
Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS), which is a compilation of violations of
public water systems across the country. The SDWIS includes both health-related violations and
monitoring and reporting problems. Violation records from the SDWIS indicate what health or
reporting standard was violated, as well as the date the violation was reported by the water
system authority. This thesis focuses solely on health violations, as reporting violations are
mostly mistakes in paperwork rather than an indication of water quality.
The SDWIS also records what the source of the water is (groundwater or surface water),
and if the water system is owned by the federal government, state government, municipality,
tribe, or private organization. Additionally, the SDWIS records how the water is utilized by the
system (emergency, interim, permanent, seasonal, or other). One limitation of the SDWIS is the
underreporting, particularly by very small (serving less than 500 people) systems (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2011). The US Government Accountability Office (GAO)
found in 2011 that 26% of health violations were either misreported or not reported at all (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2011).
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3. Literature Review
3.1 CWA – Wastewater
The most relevant literature regarding wastewater quality has shown that local
community characteristics affect compliance levels with the CWA and government intervention.
Earnhart (2004) found that community characteristics significantly affect wastewater facility
performance and regulatory interventions, such as a facility inspection from a government
official, and that they affect the decision to intervene against specific facilities. Community
characteristics included unemployment rate, voter turnout rate, percentage of Republican voters,
high school graduation rate, population density, and per capita income. Earnhart’s research
focused only on major municipal treatment facilities in Kansas in 1990-1998. He measured
compliance using facility inspection reports and formal enforcement actions, provided by the
state of Kansas.
An article by Stoner (2017), similarly, made the case that it is difficult for small
communities and poor areas to be compliant due to the inability to repay any loans or fully fund
necessary projects. We therefore expect to find that counties with a low population or per capita
income may have a higher occurrence of violations due to limited financial resources. Neither of
these papers compared compliance across states or used NPDES data, which is the focus of this
paper.
McConnell and Schwarz (1992) used wastewater data from the EPA to analyze how
violations are affected by local factors, similar to the community characteristics discussed by
Earnhart (2004) and Stoner (2017). They discovered that local factors such as the size of the
treatment plant, flow rate of the receiving water, the area’s population, regional growth, state
income, and state sensitivity to environmental issues all affected a treatment plant’s violations. In
addition, McConnell and Schwarz found that the number of violations was also influenced by
whether or not the violations would affect other states. They suggested that decreasing the
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volume of federal subsidies for wastewater treatment plants would have a negative impact on
water quality.
Chakraborti and McConnell (2012) did not focus on community or local characteristics
but rather found that “ambient water quality directly influenced the effluent limit chosen by the
regulator” during the time period between 1990-2004 within a limited regional area of Maryland,
Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Their data consisted of a sample of 100 NPDES plants from the
EPA’s Permit Compliance System (PCS) database. They found that permit requirements
decreased, or became less stringent, when water quality improved and increased when quality
worsened, even if the decreased permit requirement led to a decline in water quality in the future.
They discovered that local authorities made permitting decisions based on the current water
quality, which inherently changes the possibility of violations.
On another note, while some literature has shown that state policy implementation does
result in differing policies between states, Travis et al. (2004) argued that not all states are
capable or willing to be responsible for implementing policy based on national CWA standards.
States do, however, make decisions based on their unique circumstances. They emphasized that
federalism in environmental policy is the idea that “despite the EPA’s understanding and intent,
states do not [make decisions] on the basis of environmental needs or demand for loans, but
rather, a complex interaction of environmental, financial, and cultural factors (Travis et al.
2004).” This idea motivates the basic assumption of our argument, that because states have
primacy to implement the EPA’s CWA standards, they will not do so identically, resulting in
violations having different meanings.
Rechtschaffen (2004) also discussed why there may be differences between state
implementation programs under the CWA. He highlighted that some states struggled with
inadequate enforcement of wastewater permits, while other states may make a variety of
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monitoring and reporting mistakes, resulting in inaccurate and incomplete data. In the
cooperative federalist system, Rechtschaffen argued that the EPA should have stepped in to
remedy these problems but did not do so. A 2009 report from the GAO confirms that the federal
EPA has not intervened to correct inconsistent enforcement among states (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2009).
Going a step further, one study examined the effect of state-level corruption on
compliance with the CWA (Grooms, 2015). Grooms suggested that states who transition from
federal enforcement of water quality to state enforcement may experience a change in violation
occurrence. She found that corrupted states, i.e. those influenced heavily by firms who wished to
avoid enforcement, experienced fewer violations than non-corrupt states when they transitioned
to less federal oversight. She used NPDES violation data, but examined the years 1976-2008,
while we focus on the years 2007-2017, which is the data currently available from the EPA.
Grooms (2015) is one of the only papers to compare state-level characteristic effects on CWA
compliance. Papers mentioned previously merely make the argument that perhaps states perform
differently because of varying priorities.
While a thorough discussion of different theories of federalism and their implications is
beyond the scope of this paper, the basic idea is that in the United States, the national
government delegates policy implementation responsibilities to the states after setting specific
standards because different localities have different priorities. Helland (1998) has shown that
delegation to states does, in fact, allow state and local interests to alter the federal standard. He
argued that the delegation of enforcement and compliance with the CWA to states allows for
different outcomes in states, particularly regarding wastewater permits and enforcement. Van’t
Veld and Shogren (2012) also argued that some regions or states may choose more stringent
environmental standards while other regions do not. Previous literature has also made clear that
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state and national priorities with concern to environmental policy are not the same because
industries vary across states (Peltzman 1976 and Pashigian 1985). Additionally, several surveys
of environmental federalism have been completed, including Levinson (2003), Oates and
Portney (2003), and Dijkstra and Fredriksson (2010) that provide analysis and critique beyond
the scope of this thesis.
Most of the literature referenced previously concerning the CWA makes the argument
that states have differing priorities, thus their water quality policies and enforcement will also
vary, or examines very localized characteristics that make states unique (Earnhart, 2004; Stoner,
2017; Chakraborti and McConnell, 2012; Travis et al., 2004; van’t Veld and Shogrem 2012;
Rechtschaffen, 2004; and Grooms, 2015). We contribute to the literature by considering the
number of state regulations implemented under the CWA, as an indicator of state stringency
regarding water quality.
3.2 SDWA – Drinking Water
Little peer-reviewed research has been published on national-level water system
compliance with the SDWA. Rubin (2013), described the statistics for the SDWA violations
using data from the SDWIS, a panel data set maintained by the EPA. Rubin (2013) focused on
community water systems, which the EPA defines as a public water system that “provides water
to the same population year-round (U.S. EPA, 2020b).” Rubin found that smaller water systems
did not have more health violations than large water systems, although smaller water systems
were more likely than large systems to have monitoring and reporting violations.
Wallsten and Kosec (2008), meanwhile, examined the effects of ownership and
benchmark competition on US water system regulatory compliance using count regressions.
They also use the SDWIS data, but examine all three types of public water systems, rather than
just community water systems, from the years 1997 to 2003. Benchmark competition is the
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ability of consumers and regulators to compare their water service to water systems nearby.
Wallsten and Kosec (2008) found that when controlling for the water source, location fixed
effects, county income, urbanization, and year, overall there is a significant difference between
government-owned systems and privately-owned systems. They found that for systems that serve
less than 100,000 individuals, public water systems are more likely to violate health-based
regulations and that private systems are more likely to violate monitoring and reporting
regulations. This finding is reversed in systems that serve over 100,000 people. Importantly, they
find that greater benchmark competition reduces SDWA violations.
Building on Wallsten and Kosec (2008) and Rubin (2013), Allaire et al. (2018) looked at
patterns in health violations for 17,900 community water systems across the US for the years
1982 to 2015. They focused on health-based violations and emphasized findings on total
coliform violations, as these violations are the best reported according to the EPA. Allaire et al.
used probit regressions, with violations as a binary dependent variable, to determine the
relationship between the probability of a drinking water violation occurring and characteristics of
the water system and the counties they serve. They found that violations occurred more in rural
areas of the country as compared to more urban areas and suggested that this may be because of
a lack of funding. In addition, they used state-level fixed effects because the SDWA is primarily
enforced at the state level. This thesis expands on Allaire et al. (2018) by considering states’
regulatory stringency. We also examine the frequency and probability of health violations
occurring.
Similar to Wallsten and Kosec (2008) and Allaire et al. (2018), Konisky and Teodoro
(2016) examined whether government agencies and privately-owned drinking water utilities
comply differently with the SDWA. They used SDWIS data from 2010 to 2013 for the entire US
and US territories. Unlike other authors who used SDWIS data, Konisky and Teodoro examined
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both health and reporting violations. They also included only water systems that served 10,000
people or more. Similar to Allaire et al. (2018), they used state-level fixed effects but utilized
negative binomial regression models rather than probit. Konisky and Teodoro (2016) focused
primarily on facility ownership and found that publicly owned facilities have more health and
reporting violations than privately-owned systems. In addition, the publicly owned facilities are
less likely to be penalized for their violations.
Several other papers used the same SDWIS data, but for a specific state or region.
Rahman et al. (2010) examined health violations of all public water systems in Arizona between
1993 and 2004. Their research is similar to Wallsten and Kosec (2008) as they examined all
public water systems, not just community systems, and is similar to Allaire et al. (2018) in that
they focus on only health violations. Rahman et al. (2010) used probit regressions to find that in
Arizona, larger systems are more likely to have health violations than smaller systems and
publicly owned facilities are more likely to have violations than privately owned facilities. In
addition, systems that serve residential areas rather than schools or office buildings are more
likely to have health violations.
Some literature used drinking water quality to demonstrate arguments regarding
environmental justice. Switzer and Teodoro (2018) used SDWIS compliance data from 2010 to
2013 for the US to examine how race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status affects the health
violations of drinking water facilities. They looked at water systems that serve a population of at
least 1,000 and were publicly owned. Switzer and Teodoro used negative binomial regression
models with state-level fixed effects. They found that community racial and ethnic composition
predict health violations. Likewise, poor communities with a large percentage of minority
groups, are at a greater risk of health violations. Their dependent variable, health violations of
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drinking water facilities from SDWIS data, is similar to ours, as is the use of negative binomial
regression models.

4. Data Description
4.1 Wastewater
The data used for this paper is from EPA’s Integrated Compliance Information System National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (ICIS-NPDES), which contains both discharge
monitoring violations and permit reports of public wastewater systems across the country (U.S.
EPA, 2019c). We particularly focus on the discharge monitoring data, as the permit reports do
not record facilities’ actual discharge. Facilities report pollutant discharge monitoring data in
their discharge monitoring report forms (DMR), which are compared to NPDES permit
requirements to determine a facility’s compliance. The permit reports, on the other hand, contain
the NPDES limits or requirements for water quality standards such as flow, temperature,
dissolved oxygen, and specific chemicals. A violation occurs any time discharge contains a
pollutant amount above the permit limit, found in the permit report.
In this study, the annual county-level violations are a cumulative number of annual
discharge violations across all regulated pollutants reported in that county that may affect the
health of a population. States may regulate different pollutants not on the EPA priority pollutant
list. However, facilities are not required to monitor or report all pollutants they actually
discharge, only the pollutants that a facility is required by NPDES permit to monitor.
The ICIS-NPDES database covers all 50 states, as well as 21 US territories and tribes.
This paper will focus specifically on data from the continental United States, excluding Iowa, as
they reported no wastewater violations for the period 2007-2017. Additionally, all facilities
included in our data are publicly owned.
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4.2 Drinking Water
The drinking water data used by the papers highlighted in the literature review (Wallsten
and Kosec 2008; Rahman 2010; Rubin 2013; Konisky and Teodoro 2016; Allaire et al. 2018;
Switzer and Teodoro, 2018), and for this paper, is from the EPA’s SDWIS, which is a
compilation of violations of public water systems across the country (U.S. EPA, 2019d). The
SDWIS includes both health-related and reporting violations. Health violations occur when
treated drinking water contains more of a pollutant than permitted. Violation records from the
SDWIS indicate what health or reporting standard was violated, as well as the date the violation
was reported by the water system authority. We use only health violations from systems that
serve a population of at least 500.
There are three types of public water systems according to the EPA: a non-transient noncommunity water system, which may serve a population such as a school or a hospital less than
year-round; a transient non-community water system, which provides water in places like gas
stations and campgrounds; and a community water system, which the EPA defines as a public
water system that “provides water to the same population year-round (U.S. EPA, 2020b).” This
thesis focuses only on community water systems.
The SDWIS also records what the source of the water is (groundwater or surface water),
and if the water system is owned by the federal government, state government, municipality,
tribe, or private organization. In addition, the SDWIS records how the water is utilized by the
system (emergency, interim, permanent, seasonal, or other). This study does not include drinking
water systems that are owned by the federal government, as they are not under state jurisdiction.
We also do not consider factors such as ownership and water utilization as our data is aggregated
at the county-level rather than the facility level.
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4.3 Census Data
County-level characteristics were obtained from the US Census. The American
Community Survey data for the years 2007-2017 were obtained via Social Explorer. Countylevel characteristics were paired to water systems by county FIPS codes. According to Allaire et
al. (2018) “Assigning census information of one county to each CWS is reasonable, given that
[the majority] of systems in [the SDWIS dataset] serve only a single county” (Allaire et al.
2018). Counties that do not have a wastewater or drinking water treatment plant within their
boundaries are not included in our data.
All annual data from 2007 to 2017 are official population estimates from the US Census
Bureau. Per capita income is in terms of 2017 US dollars, adjusted by the consumer price index.
4.4 State Regulations
Annual state-level water quality regulations data are obtained from the EPA (U.S. EPA,
2019e). The data include a list of the EPA approved state water quality standards1 that the EPA
has approved or are otherwise in effect for CWA purposes. The EPA updates the list for each
state whenever a new standard has been approved or revised. It does not include a count of
federal CWA regulations. For states that do not have additional water quality standards, the EPA
proposed standards for the states to follow until they get their own approved. We did not include
the proposed standards in our count. Additionally, some states have a separate regulation for one
particular body of water, such as a lake or pond; we did not include these in our regulation count,
as they would not affect the whole state, but rather only one locality. Future research could
examine wastewater and drinking water violations at the facility level to better capture these
localized regulations, as well as factors such as facility size and flow amount (McConnell and

1

For clarity, we refer to these as “regulations” throughout the paper.
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Schwarz, 1992; Wallsten and Kosec, 2008; Rahman et al., 2010; Konisky and Teodoro, 2016;
Allaire et al., 2018).
We used the separate state lists provided by the EPA to obtain the annual count of
approved additional state water quality standards or regulations. We did this by creating a simple
tally of the state-level regulations provided for each state. For each count, we assigned the
regulation to its earliest published year and assumed that the regulation remains effective through
time. We did not consider amendments. This may ignore additional effects a regulation could
have on water systems, as they would potentially need to adjust to a revision or amendment.
Although this representation disregards the nature and stringency of the additional state
regulations, these data enable the initial analysis of the effects of state heterogeneity in
regulations on violations by considering the number of additional state regulations. The
cumulative number of effective additional state regulations is used to examine the effect of statelevel heterogeneity in water quality regulations on compliance with water quality standards (U.S.
EPA, 2019d). More in-depth research would include a stronger classification of all water-related
regulations in a state and what the regulation or standard may be affecting, be it a pollutant
standard or just a requirement of reporting by a particular date.
4.5 Descriptive Statistics
The data cover all continental states, excluding Iowa, over the years 2007-2017, as 2007
was the earliest NPDES data available. The average number of drinking water violations a
county experiences in a year is 1.5 (see Table 1). The corresponding average number of
wastewater violations is approximately 15. The separate drinking and wastewater descriptive
statistics were calculated before the two datasets were merged, meaning there are some counties
not included in either the drinking or wastewater data, that are included in the other dataset. The
maximum number of combined monthly county-level wastewater and drinking water violations
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is 1042. The average number of additional state CWA regulations is 2.4, ranging from 0 to 41. In
2017, 38 out of 47 states had at least one additional state CWA regulation. See Figure 1 for
aggregate US annual wastewater and drinking water violations.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: County-level Annual
Variable
Violation Variables
Drinking Water
Violations

Wastewater Violations

Drinking and
Wastewater Violations

Regulation Variables
Number of State
CWA Regulations

Census Variables
Population

Non-white Population

Employed Population

High School Educated
Population

Per Capita Income

Description

Obs.

Mean
(Std. Dev.)

Min

Max

Count variable, the
number of drinking water
health violations within a
county in a given year
Count variable, the
number of wastewater
violations within a county
in a given year
Count variable, the
number of drinking and
wastewater violations
within a county in a given
year

31,592

1.49
(4.34)

0

103

29,747

14.58
(32.53)

0

1042

32,445

14.81
(31.98)

0

1042

The number of state-level
regulations in addition to
CWA for each state in a
given year

32,445

2.49
(4.06)

0

41

Annual county population

32,445

102,642
(324,695)

241

10,100,000

The percent of non-white
population number in a
county in a given year
The percent of the
population 16 years and
older that are employed
in a county in a given
year
The percent of the
population 25 years and
older that has at least a
high school education in
a county in a given year
Average per capita
income in 2017 dollars
per county

32,445

16.2%
(16.2%)

0

96.5%

32,445

43.7%
(6.2%)

10.2%

74.6%

32,445

56.8%
(6.7%)

24%

89.3%

32,441

$25,107
($5,986)

$8,499

$72,539
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Both wastewater and drinking water violations aggregated at the national level can be
seen in Figure 1. We see a large decrease in total wastewater violations after 2007, with a small
increase peaking in 2015 and 2017. Drinking water violations initially increase from 2007 to
2008, with a gradual decrease until 2013, where violations peak in 2015, which is most likely
due to a federal regulatory change in the SDWIS (Allaire et al., 2018).

Figure 1. US Annual Drinking Water and Wastewater Violations

5. Empirical Methodology
This thesis expands on Allaire et al. (2018) by considering states’ stringency with the
CWA, as well as using state-level fixed effects (Wallsten and Kosec, 2008; Allaire et al., 2018;
Konisky and Teodoro, 2016; Switzer and Teodoro, 2018). The dependent variable for our models
is wastewater and drinking water violations (Grooms, 2015; Rubin, 2013; Wallsten and Kosec,
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2008; Allaire et al. 2018; Konisky and Teodoro, 2016; Rahman et al., 2010; Switzer and
Teodoro, 2018). We examine both the frequency of violations occurring, as well as the
probability with the use of logit models (Rahman et al., 2010; Allaire et al., 2018; Switzer and
Teodoro, 2018).
In addition to including the number of implemented state regulations, independent
variables included in the regressions are county-level population characteristics such as
population, non-white population, employed population, high school educated population, and
average per capita income (Earnhart, 2004; McConnell and Schwarz, 1992; Wallsten and Kosec,
2008; Allaire et al., 2018; Switzer and Teodoro, 2018).
As our data are count data, a first step would be to use a Poisson regression model, where
a major assumption is that the mean and variance are equal (Cameron 1998). A likelihood ratio
test of our count data, however, with a test statistic of 21,000 and a p-value of 0.000, rejects the
hypothesis of mean and variance equality. The large test statistic suggests that the dependent
variable is over-dispersed and is not sufficiently described by the Poisson model. To address this
overdispersion due to heterogeneity, we rely on Negative Binomial (NB) regressions (Long and
Freese 2014). The NB regressions in this study reflect the panel nature of the data and have
manual year- and state-level fixed effects. Year fixed effects control for changes in federal
regulations or compliance over time. State-level fixed effects control time invariant state
characteristics. Only 47 states are included in the models, as Alaska and Hawaii are not part of
the continental United States and Iowa was dropped because they reported no wastewater
regulations.
Another explanation for overdispersion is a significant share of zero dependent variable
observations that are generated by a stochastic process which differ from the NB distribution.
This is of concern for our data, as 26% of the total violation observations have zero values, while
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wastewater violations and drinking water violations separately are 34% and 68% zero values,
respectively (see Table 2).

Table 2. Observed Frequencies of the County Annual Violations
Total Violations

Wastewater Violations

Observed
Counts

Freq.

Percent

0
1
2
3
4
5+

8403
2568
2232
1448
1548
16246

25.9
7.91
6.88
4.46
4.77
50.07

Observed
Counts
0
1
2
3
4
5+

Drinking Water Violations

Freq.

Percent

11012
2202
2212
1219
1402
14398

33.94
6.79
6.82
3.76
4.32
44.38

Observed
Counts
0
1
2
3
4
5+

Freq.

Percent

22091
3719
1740
1011
977
2907

68.09
11.46
5.36
3.12
3.01
8.96

The Vuong test confirms that a significant share of zero dependent variable observations
is generated by a stochastic process that differs from the NB distribution (Vuong, 1989 and
Greene, 1994). We use the bias corrected Vuong test as the ordinary Vuong test can produce
biased results (Desmarais and Harden, 2013 and Wilson, 2015).
Therefore, we use a Zero Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) specification (Mullahy,
1986; Heilbron, 1994; Welsh et al., 1996; Yip and Yau, 2005). Zero-inflated count data models
are designed to distinguish between zeros generated from different processes. When analyzing
count data, there may be a significant number of zeros. However, zeros can occur for different
reasons or processes. In this data, a water system may have a zero for a given year because they
are compliant with both federal and state water regulations and do not have any violations.
Another water system may have zero violations for a given year due to a lack of proper
reporting. This first water system was certain to have no violations because of the strictness of
the additional state regulations, as well as its monitoring capabilities. The second water system
could have had a violation if underreporting had occurred but did not.
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Zero-inflated negative binomial models cannot be estimated using a panel data structure;
thus, a comparison of panel NB and pooled ZINB regressions will have to suffice (Elbakidze and
Jin, 2015). We examine total combined violations as well as disaggregated drinking water and
wastewater violations for the years 2007-2017. The ZINB regression models have year- and
state-level fixed effects.
As a robustness check, we include both a conditional logit and a logit regression model.
A conditional logit model is similar to a fixed effects logit model for panel data but does not
have biased results (Chamberlain 1980; Greene 2002). It fits maximum likelihood models with a
dichotomous dependent variable and differs from a regular logit model in that the data are
grouped and the likelihood is calculated relative to each group. In our case, the group is counties.
We also include a logit regression model with state and year fixed effects, consistent with Allaire
et al. (2018). We include both conditional logit and logit regression models to check the
robustness and consistency of the results. Additional robustness check analysis includes a NB
regression at the state-level with year fixed effects and regression models run for just the year
2017 with state-level fixed effects.
Additional regression models using wastewater and drinking water violations as separate
dependent variables with both year and state-level fixed effects are also examined. These models
include a negative binomial model, a zero-inflated negative binomial model, a conditional logit
model, and a logit model with state fixed effects, similar to the main regression models in Table
3. Wastewater regressions can be found in Table 4 and drinking water regressions in Table 5,
before the robustness check analysis.
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6. Results
6.1 Main Results
As shown in Table 3, results from both the panel NB regression model and the ZINB
model are similar. Column 1 shows coefficients – with the associated standard errors below –
from the panel NB model. Column 2 presents the coefficients and standard errors of the ZINB
model. Columns 3 and 4 show the results for two of the models we use for a robustness check, a
conditional logit and a logit state fixed effects model. Columns 3 and 4 will be discussed in the
robustness analysis.
The main regression models (columns 1 and 2) show that state regulations have a positive
relationship with the number of county-level wastewater and drinking water violations in the
contemporaneous year. However, we observe that as these regulations take effect over time – as
demonstrated by the one-year lagged regulation variable – the regulatory effect becomes
negative and significant. The coefficients of state regulations demonstrate that the year a policy
or regulation is implemented, total violations become higher. One year after a new regulation is
implemented, however, counties experience a decrease in total violations as they update their
procedures, enforcement, or technology to be in compliance with new standards.
In addition, several county characteristic variables are consistent across both the NB and
the ZINB models and reflect what is found in the literature. We see that as both the total
population and the percentage of non-white population increase, the number of violations also
increases (Wallsten and Kosec, 2008). Additionally, as the percentage of the employed
population increases, violations decrease. These results are consistent with those found in the
literature such as Earnhart (2004) and Allaire et al. (2018). While the per capita income
coefficient is positive in both the NB and the ZINB models, it is insignificant. However, the
interaction term between non-white population percentage and per capita income shows that as
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the effect of per capita income increases, the effect of the non-white population decreases
(Switzer and Teodoro, 2018).

Table 3. Annual County-level Regressions
(1)
Drinking and Wastewater
Negative
Violations
Binomial, FE

(2)
Zero-Inflated
Negative Binomial

(3)
Conditional
Logit

(4)
Logit

0.232***
(0.0151)
24.57***
(3.302)
-0.885***
(0.334)
0.109
(0.303)

0.472***
(0.0101)
20.66***
(2.299)
-0.249
(0.274)
0.546**
(0.213)

1.214
(1.077)
-3.375
(34.35)
1.852
(2.880)
2.190
(2.969)

0.644***
(0.0270)
38.17***
(7.727)
1.247*
(0.666)
2.303***
(0.523)

Interaction of Non-white
% and Per capita income

0.200
(0.131)
-2.523***
(0.331)

0.0901
(0.0988)
-2.080***
(0.231)

0.284
(1.131)
-0.0327
(3.446)

-0.0947
(0.259)
-3.841***
(0.773)

Number of state
regulations

0.0511***
(0.0103)

-0.00803
(0.0164)

0.201***
(0.0566)

0.162***
(0.0482)

Regulations lagged 1 yr

-0.0457***
(0.0101)
No

-0.0558***
(0.0178)
Yes

-0.306***
(0.0647)
No

-0.216***
(0.0524)
Yes

County Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

No

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

10,491

-3.716
(2.326)
23,297

Population, log
Non-white percent of pop.
Employed percent of pop.
High school educated
percent of pop.
Per capita income avg.

State Fixed Effects

Constant
Observations
Number of Counties

-3.177***
-2.201***
(1.152)
(0.851)
22,845
23,297
2,307
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The pooled ZINB model in Column 2, Table 3 included state-level fixed effects.
Although the regulation variables resulted in a similar pattern to the NB regression in Column 1,
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the number of state regulations in the contemporaneous year is negative but statistically
insignificant. However, the one-year lag remains negative and significant. The total population,
percentage of the non-white population, percentage of the employed population, and the
interaction term variables all closely reflect the results from the panel NB model in model (1).
The results from both the NB and ZINB regression models demonstrate that counties
with very large populations experience more violations. This is consistent with the literature on
both wastewater and drinking water quality (Earnhart, 2004 and Allaire et al., 2018). Balazs et al.
(2011) and Switzer and Teodoro (2018), who all demonstrated that areas with higher non-white
populations experience higher numbers of water violations. Our results confirm Switzer and
Teodoro (2018) findings and show that increased average per capita income mitigates the
number of violations when interacted with the non-white population percentage. Additionally,
Earnhart (2004) results showed that having a larger employed population negatively impacts the
number of violations in a community.
6.2 Additional Results
Additional regression models using wastewater violations and drinking water violations
as separate dependent variables with both year and state-level fixed effects are also examined.
These models include a negative binomial model, a zero-inflated negative binomial model, a
conditional logit model, and a logit model with state fixed effects, similar to the main regression
models in Table 3.
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Table 4. Annual County-Level Wastewater Regressions
(1)
(2)
Wastewater Violations
Negative
Zero-Inflated
Binomial, FE
Negative Binomial
Population, log

(3)
Conditional
Logit

(4)
Logit

0.178***
(0.0162)
12.63***
(3.522)
-0.614***
(0.142)
-1.386***
(0.354)

0.456***
(0.0114)
16.81***
(2.477)
0.232**
(0.112)
-1.672***
(0.249)

0.642
(1.123)
-61.78*
(36.83)
-1.517
(1.159)
5.887
(3.708)

0.588***
(0.0258)
30.43***
(6.604)
-0.295
(0.251)
-3.025***
(0.661)

0.451
(0.361)
1.164***
(0.325)

-0.325
(0.307)
0.298
(0.242)

-2.513
(2.989)
-1.644
(3.133)

1.693**
(0.677)
2.849***
(0.520)

0.0275**
(0.0110)
-0.0391***
(0.0110)
No

0.00271
(0.0179)
-0.0631***
(0.0194)
Yes

0.276***
(0.0612)
-0.236***
(0.0680)
No

0.167***
(0.0472)
-0.138***
(0.0504)
Yes

County Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

No

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

10,196

-1.924
(2.211)
21,973

Non-white percent of pop.
Employed percent of pop.
High school educated
percent of pop.
Per capita income avg.
Interaction of Non-white %
and Per capita income
Number of state regulations
Regulations lagged 1 yr
State Fixed Effects

Constant
Observations
Number of Counties

4.564***
-3.322***
(1.242)
(0.958)
21,112
21,973
2,179
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The SDWA regulates mainly drinking water facilities but also includes standards for
sources such as rivers, springs, reservoirs, lakes, and groundwater wells (Tiemann, 2017). This
leads to overlapping regulatory standards as the CWA also regulates most of those bodies of
water. The quality of the source water before treatment will affect the final drinking water
quality. Although drinking water quality is directly enforced by policies implemented under the
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SDWA, we take into account the indirect effect of the CWA policies because of the overlapping
oversight of water bodies, which is reflected in the regression results in Table 5.
The results of Table 5 demonstrate that drinking water violations are indeed affected by
state-level regulations pertaining to the CWA in the year that a regulation is implemented. These
results correspond to the fact that drinking water in the United States is directly regulated by the
SDWA, while water quality as a whole is regulated by the CWA. This conclusion is
demonstrated by the statistically significant and positive coefficients of the number of state
regulations across all four models presented in Table 5. However, there is limited evidence that
state-level CWA regulations decrease drinking water violations after the implementation year, as
demonstrated by the lag variable.
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Table 5. Annual County-Level Drinking Water Regressions
(1)
(2)
Drinking Water Violations
Negative
Zero-Inflated
Binomial, FE
Negative Binomial
Population, log

(3)
Conditional
Logit

(4)
Logit

0.209***
(0.0271)
6.294
(7.133)
0.372
(0.245)
-0.627
(0.715)

0.293***
(0.0193)
24.07***
(4.997)
0.587***
(0.184)
-2.467***
(0.491)

-0.628
(0.793)
-4.206
(29.82)
0.767
(0.891)
0.210
(2.957)

0.430***
(0.0194)
22.55***
(4.425)
-0.115
(0.187)
-2.315***
(0.444)

Interaction of Non-white
% and Per capita income

-0.950
(0.620)
-1.851***
(0.542)

-3.951***
(0.565)
-1.321***
(0.441)

1.115
(2.171)
1.819
(2.471)

-1.901***
(0.520)
0.867**
(0.417)

Number of state
regulations

0.0899***
(0.0193)

0.110***
(0.0311)

0.157***
(0.0376)

0.116***
(0.0321)

Regulations lagged 1 yr

-0.0786***
(0.0192)
No

-0.0140
(0.0339)
Yes

-0.0499
(0.0430)
No

-0.0280
(0.0339)
Yes

County Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

No

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

-4.266**
(2.162)

-6.972***
(1.593)

Non-white percent of pop.
Employed percent of pop.
High school educated
percent of pop.
Per capita income avg.

State Fixed Effects

Constant

Observations
Number of Counties

18,872
22,959
1,897
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-3.922**
(1.600)
17,314

22,959

6.3 Robustness Check
As acknowledged in Section 5, there is no perfect model for over-dispersed panel data.
We, therefore, compared a ZINB model, which treats the data as pooled, with a negative
binomial model, which treats the data as a panel. As a robustness check, we also included a
conditional logit model (see Column 3 in Table 3) and a fixed-effects logit model (Column 4 in
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Table 3). The coefficients of both logit models demonstrate the probability of a violation
occurring in a county or state given that there is one additional state regulation.
The third model, the conditional logit in Column 3, Table 3, also reflects similar results
as the main two models. The results are shown for the specification with year fixed effects. The
conditional logit model shows that again, the effect of the number of state regulations in the
contemporaneous year is positive and significant, the one-year lag is negative and significant. It
also reflects similar coefficient results for the total population and the interaction term.
We also included a logit model, with state and year fixed effects, as one additional check
on the consistency of our results. The regulation results match the results from the other three
models. In addition, the total population, percent of non-white population, and the interaction
term have similar results to the NB and ZINB regression models.
We also ran a NB regression at the state-level (Table 6) and NB and logit regressions at
the county-level using the 2017 data (Table 7). These tables show similar results regarding state
regulations (Table 3), although the 2017 regression results are not significant.
The NB regression in Table 6 examines drinking and wastewater violations aggregated at
the state level. There is a year fixed effect included. The resulting coefficients reflect very
closely with the county-level NB model in Table 3. The state regulations coefficient is positive,
while the one-year lag is negative and significant.
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Table 6. Annual State-level Regression
(1)
Drinking and Wastewater
Negative
Violations
Binomial, FE
Population, log
Non-white percent of pop.
Employed percent of pop.
High school educated
percent of pop.
Per capita income avg.

0.310**
(0.135)
-17.78
(45.63)
1.063
(1.114)
1.941
(4.534)

Interaction of Non-white
% and Per capita income

-7.601**
(3.509)
11.40***
(4.313)

Number of state
regulations

0.0459
(0.0360)

Regulations lagged 1 yr

-0.0580*
(0.0351)
Yes

Year Fixed Effects
Constant

-16.13
(11.02)

Observations
357
Number of States
36
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Regression models in Table 7 reflect the regulatory results in both Tables 3 and 6. These
models are not panel data, as they use the data from only 2017. However, they both have statelevel fixed effects. The NB regression in Column 1 shows the number of state regulations in the
contemporaneous year as positive and significant, while the regulations lagged one year is
negative and significant.
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The logit model in Column 2 again shows similar results regarding the regulation
impacts. The number of state regulations in the contemporaneous year is positive and significant.
The one-year lag is negative and statistically significant.

Table 7. 2017 County-level Regressions
(1)
(2)
Drinking and
Negative
Logit
Wastewater Violations
Binomial
Population, log

0.456***
(0.0304)
14.93**
(6.803)
0.229
(0.301)
-1.530**
(0.681)

0.655***
(0.0925)
21.43
(20.48)
0.0593
(0.928)
-2.148
(2.058)

Interaction of Non-white
% and Per capita income

-1.946**
(0.838)
-0.282
(0.640)

1.266
(2.432)
1.126
(1.806)

Number of state
regulations

2.949***
(0.485)

3.853***
(1.066)

Regulations lagged 1 yr

-3.662***
(0.577)

-4.804***
(1.311)

Constant

-5.757**
(2.652)

-8.944
(8.266)

2,093

1,839

Non-white pop, log
Employed pop, log
Highschool educated
pop, log
Per capita income, log

Observations

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

6.4 Policy Implications and Discussion
These results build on related research described in the literature review. States make
various regulatory decisions regarding the CWA based on their unique circumstances (Travis et
al., 2004) and have varying degrees of CWA enforcement (Rechtschaffen, 2004; Grooms, 2015).
No study has considered the state-level stringency of water quality regulations as a factor
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effecting either drinking or wastewater violations. We contribute to the literature by considering
the number of state regulations implemented under the CWA, as a measure of state stringency
regarding water quality standards. In addition, we considered the effect of CWA regulations on
drinking water quality.
The research findings demonstrate that states who enact regulatory standards in addition
to the CWA see a decrease in water quality violations, once water systems and counties have
time to adjust and respond to the new regulation. A decrease in violations under stricter
regulations implies, but does not prove, that an improvement in water quality has taken place.
First and foremost, improved water quality improves the population’s health, as poor water
quality negatively impacts health (Allaire et al., 2018). Additionally, improved water quality
should improve overall quality of life as it affects people’s health, well-being, industry, and
recreational activities.
Our results imply that states with few additional regulations could consider enacting more
stringent water quality standards than the CWA in order to decrease their reported violations if
that is a state priority. We know from previous literature that some state government leaders may
regard water quality as a lower priority than leaders in other states (van’t Veld and Shogren,
2012). Other factors that may improve water quality that are not examined in this thesis include
better enforcement at the state-level (Grooms, 2015), more funding for treatment plants
(McConnell and Schwarz, 1992), or even the EPA stepping in more often, as argued by
Rechtschaffen (2004).
Funding for treatment plants is often provided by the state through a federal loan
program. The distribution of this federal money is, in part, determined by the overall
performance of treatment plants. Plants that have more violations and states with worse water
quality, as measured by violations, should ideally be getting access to greater funds to improve
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their performance. Federal dollars are best allocated to poor performing states with lower
stringency, as our results show that higher stringency improves future compliance. The marginal
productivity of each dollar spent by the government is greater at the poor-performing states with
lower standards than better-performing states with a higher standard (Anica and Elbakidze,
2020). The results here show that the compliance record, in terms of the number of violations,
depends on not only the operations of the facility but also on additional state-level regulations.
In this respect, the use of compliance records for allocating funds to improve compliance
performance, without accounting for state-level heterogeneity in regulatory standards can be
misleading.
There are limitations to this study, and further research on this topic is needed to better
understand the effect of regulatory stringency on state-level CWA compliance. First, counting
EPA approved regulations for each state is a basic way to classify overall water quality priorities
of a state. Our count representation disregards the nature and stringency of these additional state
water regulations. We also assign the regulation to its earliest published year and assume that the
regulation remains effective. More in-depth research would include a stronger classification of
all water-related regulations in a state and what the regulation or standard may be affecting, be it
a pollutant standard or just a requirement of reporting by a particular date.
Second, as discussed earlier, reporting for both wastewater and drinking water violations
may not be consistent across states and facilities. In addition, the GAO has found that
approximately 26% of drinking water violations are not reported (US Government
Accountability Office, 2011). Rechtschaffen (2004), Konisky and Teodoro (2016), and Allaire et
al. (2018) also acknowledge this underreporting.
Third, Chakraborti and McConnell (2012) pointed out the possibility of endogenous
permitting standards. This may affect violation rates and may have some implications for the
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results found here. Since these permitting standards are pollutant specific, this issue can be
addressed by examining pollutant specific violations. In this study, we focus on the aggregate
number of violations and leave the examination of pollutant specific violations for future studies.
Further research should also include enforcement factors as well, building off of research by
Grooms (2015).

7. Conclusion
The Clean Water Act (CWA) was enacted to prohibit the discharge of any regulated
pollutant from a point source into navigable waters in the United States without a permit from
the EPA. The permits set restrictions on the type and the quantity of pollutants that the owners of
the permits can discharge. States and Native American tribes are charged with primary oversight
and enforcement responsibility of both the CWA and the SDWA, with a requirement to maintain
regulatory standards at least as stringent as the EPA’s. States are also able to implement their
own regulatory standards in addition to the CWA, making their overall water quality regulation
more stringent than the federal standards. We examine how the occurrence of water quality
violations differs in states with additional CWA regulatory standards, compared to states who
follow only the federal regulatory standards.
Regression models are utilized to evaluate the effects of additional state regulations on
the occurrence of water violations, both wastewater and drinking water violations, together and
separately. The two main models examined were a pooled ZINB model and a panel NB model.
Conditional logit and logit models were also included as robustness checks, in addition to several
other models. The results of these regression analyses demonstrate that while violations increase
in the year when new state regulations are implemented, increasing the number of state water
quality regulations decreases the number of violations after a state regulation has been in place
for at least one year. Meaning, the number of violations decreases after facilities have had time to
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adjust to the newer, more stringent requirements. In addition, drinking water violations are
affected by state CWA regulations (see Table 5). This is consistent with the expectation, as
drinking water in the United States is regulated directly by the SDWA, while the CWA regulates
water quality more broadly.
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Appendix 1.
Priority Pollutant List
Priority Pollutants are a set of chemical pollutants we regulate, and for which we have
developed analytical test methods. The current list of 126 Priority Pollutants, shown below,
can also be found at 40 CFR Part 423, Appendix A.
These are not the only pollutants regulated in Clean Water Act programs. The list is
an important starting point for EPA to consider, for example, in developing national
discharge standards (such as Effluent Guidelines) or in national permitting programs (such
as NPDES).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Acenaphthene
Acrolein
Acrylonitrile
Benzene
Benzidine
Carbon tetrachloride
Chlorobenzene
1,2,4-trichlorobenzene
Hexachlorobenzene
1,2-dichloroethane
1,1,1-trichloreothane
Hexachloroethane
1,1-dichloroethane
1,1,2-trichloroethane
1,1,2,2-tetrachloroethane
Chloroethane
(Removed)
Bis(2-chloroethyl) ether
2-chloroethyl vinyl ethers
2-chloronaphthalene
2,4,6-trichlorophenol
Parachlorometa cresol
Chloroform
2-chlorophenol
1,2-dichlorobenzene
1,3-dichlorobenzene
1,4-dichlorobenzene
3,3-dichlorobenzidine
1,1-dichloroethylene
1,2-trans-dichloroethylene
2,4-dichlorophenol
1,2-dichloropropane
1,3-dichloropropylene
2,4-dimethylphenol

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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2,4-dinitrotoluene
2,6-dinitrotoluene
1,2-diphenylhydrazine
Ethylbenzene
Fluoranthene
4-chlorophenyl phenyl ether
4-bromophenyl phenyl ether
Bis(2-chloroisopropyl) ether
Bis(2-chloroethoxy) methane
Methylene chloride
Methyl chloride
Methyl bromide
Bromoform
Dichlorobromomethane
(Removed)
(Removed)
Chlorodibromomethane
Hexachlorobutadiene
Hexachlorocyclopentadiene
Isophorone
Naphthalene
Nitrobenzene
2-nitrophenol
4-nitrophenol
2,4-dinitrophenol
4,6-dinitro-o-cresol
N-nitrosodimethylamine
N-nitrosodiphenylamine
N-nitrosodi-n-propylamine
Pentachlorophenol
Phenol
Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate
Butyl benzyl phthalate
Di-N-Butyl Phthalate
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69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Di-n-octyl phthalate
Diethyl Phthalate
Dimethyl phthalate
Benzo(a) anthracene
Benzo(a) pyrene
Benzo(b) fluoranthene
Benzo(k) fluoranthene
Chrysene
Acenaphthylene
Anthracene
Benzo(ghi) perylene
Fluorene
Phenanthrene
Dibenzo(,h) anthracene
Indeno (1,2,3-cd) pyrene
Pyrene
Tetrachloroethylene
Toluene
Trichloroethylene
Vinyl chloride
Aldrin
Dieldrin
Chlordane
4,4-DDT
4,4-DDE
4,4-DDD
Alpha-endosulfan
Beta-endosulfan
Endosulfan sulfate
Endrin
Endrin aldehyde

100. Heptachlor
101. Heptachlor epoxide
102. Alpha-BHC
103. Beta-BHC
104. Gamma-BHC
105. Delta-BHC
106. PCB-1242 (Arochlor 1242)
107. PCB-1254 (Arochlor 1254)
108. PCB-1221 (Arochlor 1221)
109. PCB-1232 (Arochlor 1232)
110. PCB-1248 (Arochlor 1248)
111. PCB-1260 (Arochlor 1260)
112. PCB-1016 (Arochlor 1016)
113. Toxaphene
114. Antimony
115. Arsenic
116. Asbestos
117. Beryllium
118. Cadmium
119. Chromium
120. Copper
121. Cyanide, Total
122. Lead
123. Mercury
124. Nickel
125. Selenium
126. Silver
127. Thallium
128. Zinc
129. 2,3,7,8-TCDD
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